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Abstract
In recent years the Chinese iron and steel industry has gone through a period 
of hyper growth, propelling it to the very top of global steel-making. Com-
manding nearly half of global output and correspondingly utilizing a similar 
share of inputs and raw materials, China has become the key player in this 
industry, exerting signiﬁcant inﬂuence on global prices and cost parameters. 
But just as the rise of China's iron and steel industry was not only driven by 
market forces but heavily inﬂuenced by government intervention in com-
modity and ﬁnancial markets, government authorities are also trying to exert 
inﬂuence on the way Chinese steel-makers are acting on the global markets. 
Balancing market forces and industrial policy strategy at the global markets 
interface, political decision-makers have worked out an elaborate framework 
of measures to carve out maximum beneﬁts for domestic enterprises and the 
economy as a whole. By examining these mechanisms, this article aims to 
illustrate that sectoral industrial policy in China does not push for expand-
ing exports and investments across the board but carefully and discretion-
arily promotes global integration in some areas while delaying it in others.
Keywords: China, steel industry, industrial policy, trade policy, foreign direct invest-
ment 
Introduction 
Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, consecutive leader-
ship generations have attributed great importance to the steel industry, 
considering a large steel sector as a basic precondition for successful 
national development. But after an attempt to rapidly increase steel out-
put during the 'Great Leap Forward' campaign spectacularly backﬁred, 
very slow progress was made before the onset of economic reforms. 
Since then, Chinese steel-making has greatly improved its structural 
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and technological set-up and witnessed an unprecedented rise after the 
early 1990s. Driven by nationwide urbanization and industrialization 
trends, output volumes skyrocketed, without falling back even dur-
ing three global ﬁnancial crises. After surpassing Japan as the world's 
leading steel producer in 1996, volumes have continued to expand so 
that since 2009 almost half of global steel output took place in China 
(WSA various years).1 Having reached 627 million tons of crude steel 
output in 2010, the Ministry for Industry and Information Technology 
(MIIT) predicts crude steel output to exceed 700 million tons in 2011 
(MIIT 2010, 2011), with another 100 million tons of production capacity 
being installed.
These developments have gone along with China's rise as a major 
importer and exporter of both steel products and relevant raw materi-
als. Before the recent global economic downturn, the country was on a 
long-term trajectory of export growth. In 2006, China became the world's 
leading steel exporter but lost the title to Japan again in 2009.2 In the 
meantime, Chinese enterprises held a cumulative world market share 
of 12 to 15 per cent.3 However, while exports are an important aspect 
for some Chinese mills, their share in domestic steel production has 
never topped 12 per cent, which is a fairly low percentage compared to 
other major steel-producing nations (WSA 2010).4 Interestingly, there is 
a huge discrepancy in the composition of China's imports and exports. 
While imports are still made up of technology-intensive wares, like 
electrical steel or galvanized sheet, exports mostly consist of medium-
grade products, such as hot rolled sheet or section steel. While it has to 
be conceded that Baosteel and a handful of other leading steel-makers 
have expanded exports of high-grade materials, for example, coated, 
plated or clad sheets, in recent years, differences continue to exist be-
tween incoming and outgoing goods in terms of technical speciﬁcations 
and quality levels nevertheless. Correspondingly, the average cost per 
ton of imports and exports was US$1,181 and US$792 respectively for 
the ﬁrst half of 2010 (CISA 2010).
In recognition of the potential inﬂuence of the steel industry, the Chi-
nese government is dedicating substantial resources to the monitoring 
and micro-management of China's steel industry in general and its inter-
action with the global markets in particular. Balancing market forces and 
industrial policy strategy, political decision-makers have worked out an 
elaborate framework of measures to create an environment conducive to 
the development of this industry. As such, the steel industry is subjected 
to numerous policy measures steering its development in both the do-
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mestic and international context (Taube & in der Heiden 2009, 2010). By 
examining those mechanisms addressing the global markets interface, 
this article aims to illustrate that sectoral industrial policy in China does 
not push for expanding exports and investments across the board, but 
carefully and discretionarily promotes global integration in some areas 
while delaying it in others. Sections two and three will discuss how gov-
ernment regulations have shaped the global integration of China's steel 
enterprises, with section two focusing on trade, that is, Chinese exports 
and imports of raw materials and (semi) ﬁnished products, and section 
three targeting inward and outward directed investment issues. The 
article concludes with a summary of ﬁndings in section four.
China's Trade in Iron and Steel Industry-Related 
Products: Patterns and Policies
With regard to foreign trade, government policy heavily emphasizes 
the concept of 'two markets and two resources' as a source of advantage 
(e.g., NDRC 2005; MIIT 2009). Companies are asked to seize opportuni-
ties from leveraging procurement and sales both on the home market 
and abroad. In the following, we will take a detailed look at the way 
this is done and how Chinese policy-makers are trying to inﬂuence and 
structure steel-related import and export activities.
Imports of Raw Materials
Iron ore is the most important raw material for steel-making. In 2009, 
92 per cent of Chinese and 70 per cent of global steel production was 
based on smelting the mineral (WSA 2010). China possesses the world's 
fourth largest iron ore deposits and is the largest miner of the mineral, 
producing 900 million tons—equivalent to 39 per cent5 of world output 
in 2009 (USGS 2010). The unabated steep rise in crude steel output over 
the past 20 years has driven China's mining industry to continuously 
expand operations, thereby vastly increasing the supply of domestic 
iron ore. However, while this process is still well underway, new mining 
projects have gradually become more demanding both technically and 
ﬁnancially as remaining deposits get increasingly difﬁcult to exploit. 
With domestic miners burdened by rising production costs and limited 
growth potential, Chinese steel-makers faced with escalating shortages 
and rising prices have long turned to the world market for their iron 
ore needs. Adding to the list of superlatives, China became the world's 
largest iron ore importer in 2003 and has kept the title ever since (Yu & 
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Yang 2010). By 2009, Chinese imports accounted for about two-thirds 
of the total internationally traded iron ore, both in terms of volume and 
value (United Nations Statistics Division 2010; WSA 2010). At the same 
time, the country depended on international deliveries for 69 per cent 
or 630 million tons of the iron ore processed in its furnaces.6 Due to 
the unrivalled dimensions of Chinese iron ore imports, world markets 
bore witness to dramatic increases in trade volumes7 and price levels.8 
To ease the pressure on its steel mills, the Chinese government and the 
China Iron and Steel Association (CISA) in particular have launched 
a whole range of initiatives designed to create a Chinese buyers cartel 
and increase the negotiation power of Chinese enterprises vis-à-vis 
international iron ore miners and shipping lines (CISA 2009b). 
Government authorities have blamed the large number of iron ore 
importers and the subsequently low degree of coordination for un-
necessarily inﬂating import demand and driving up market prices 
(CISA 2009b). To tackle this structural problem, a series of measures for 
streamlining iron ore import operations has been introduced. In a ﬁrst 
move, in 2005, a coalition of government agencies and CISA compiled 
a catalogue of requirements Chinese enterprises would have to meet in 
order to qualify as iron ore importers. Based on this catalogue, a list of 
approved importers has been put together while all other enterprises 
were effectively barred from iron ore import transactions. Since then, the 
original number of more than 500 qualiﬁed importers has been gradually 
cut to 112 companies—70 of which are steel-makers—in 2009 (Hexun.
com 2010). This import cartel stands to become even more exclusive 
since new standards introduced in early 2010 are intended to further 
reduce the number of enterprises. In order to maintain its import license, 
a company now needs to prove ore imports in excess of 1 million tons 
in 2009 (CISA & CCCMC 2010).
Tasked with supervising iron ore imports by central government 
authorities, CISA is in charge of several initiatives to consolidate and 
regulate iron ore import activities. In February 2009, the association 
launched a 'Convention for Enhancing Self-discipline in the Iron and 
Steel Industry to Ensure an Orderly Iron Ore Import Trade', stipulating 
that the whole of the industry be represented by a designated group of 
negotiators at the international iron ore price talks and mandating that 
the resulting price agreement be binding for all Chinese importers (CISA 
2009a). This effectively forbids other interested parties from engaging in 
their own price negotiations and striking a separate deal. Furthermore, 
the small number of steel-makers approved for ore imports may not pur-
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chase amounts in excess of their own consumption needs. Medium-sized 
enterprises and those importing less than one million tons per year are 
put at a disadvantage because they have to procure imported materials 
through an agency system, forcing them to accept service surcharges 
of 3 to 5 per cent. The large number of smaller players that are due to 
lose their production license based on a host of industrial policy guide-
lines of recent years are cut off from the supply of imported materials 
completely (CISA 2009a). This system is complemented by a barrage 
of monitoring, control and supervision mechanisms that are intended 
to stall any kind of circumvention attempt. While the system is tilted 
in favour of the relatively small group of large, integrated state-owned 
enterprises and clearly discriminates against smaller players, it mostly 
aims to limit overall import volumes and strengthen China's bargain-
ing power in price negotiations (CISA 2009a). It can be argued that in 
both regards, it has a potentially signiﬁcant effect on market outcomes 
for global iron ore trade. For the lack of a counterfactual, however, it 
is difﬁcult to assess the extent to which this initiative has actually cut 
import volumes or impacted prices.
While the idea of pooling demand to increase negotiation power vis-
à-vis suppliers is certainly a strategy that is not in conﬂict with regular 
market behaviour, what is striking in the Chinese case is the state-led 
organization of such an import cartel on the one hand and the obvious 
neglect of the competitive juxtaposition of steel mills in the speciﬁc 
regions on the other hand. Given a normal market framework and 
intensive competition, as should be expected in a sector featuring mas-
sive overcapacities, the question arises whether individual companies 
would not rather try to 'go it alone' and derive competitive advantages 
from better import prices than their local contenders. Especially the 
larger corporations designated to conduct the negotiations for the whole 
group could be expected to proﬁt from separated negotiations. Given 
their size and corresponding import demand, these companies could 
be expected to negotiate better prices than their local contenders and 
therefore come into a position to improve their competitive positioning 
vis-à-vis the latter—up to a stage where they could drive these under-
performing companies out of the market and thereby contribute to a 
much needed consolidation of the industry as a whole. Obviously, in 
their efforts to improve the 'well-being' of the national steel industry 
as a whole, China's administrators are still trusting more in their skills 
to steer developments by discretionary interventions than in the self-
regulating power of competitive markets.
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Imports of Finished Products
Chinese steel imports have traditionally been dominated by high-val-
ued-added goods. This trend has not yet been broken with electrical 
steel or coated sheets playing a major role (CISA 2010). After its acces-
sion to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China markedly 
lowered import tariffs on steel products and largely complied with 
WTO obligations. Except for repeated calls from government agencies 
or the government-directed CISA to downstream industries encour-
aging them to favour domestically produced steel over imports, no 
signiﬁcant market intervention can be found. Since steel is regarded as 
a key ingredient for economic development, governments on various 
levels have dedicated resources to help domestic steel-makers ramp 
up production volumes, improve quality levels and bring down costs 
for inputs and utilities. However, it can be argued that assistance in the 
form of direct subsidies, policy loans, tax beneﬁts or preferential access 
to vital inputs, energy, water, transportation infrastructure, etc. has 
contributed to the massive output increases of recent years and thereby 
greatly diminished import demand (Taube & in der Heiden 2009). Fol-
lowing this line of reasoning brings up two questions: First, would the 
Chinese economy have generated the same level of steel demand absent 
substantial domestic production capacities? And second, would the 
world market be able to supply enough steel products to accommodate 
a hypothetical Chinese import dependence similar to that of other major 
steel producing countries such as the United States? Considering the 
fact that China's share of global steel consumption has soared for two 
decades and has almost hit the 50 per cent mark in 2010, the second 
question would have to be answered with a clear 'no'. In 2009, China 
consumed a total of 564 million tons of steel, 96 per cent of which was 
domestically produced (WSA 2010). Based on the 2009 numbers, even 
a modest rise in import share of a single percentage point would have 
entailed additional shipments of 5.6 million tons. Bringing the share all 
the way up to 25 per cent—the level of the United States—would have 
put China in a position to capture 44 per cent of globally traded steel 
products (WSA 2010). The latter case would also have put major strain 
on the global steel market implying momentous distortions of interna-
tional production and consumption patterns and steep price increases 
for ﬁnished products. While a slightly slower pace of capacity expansion 
would have avoided the problem of overcapacities, a severely lagging 
development would have dampened the prospects of China's overall 
economic development, in turn depressing (import) demand.
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Exports of Raw Materials and Semi-ﬁnished Products
Even after China's WTO accession, government authorities have actively 
discouraged the export of certain raw materials (such as coke), semi-
ﬁnished products (e.g., billet, slab) and products in the ﬁrst stages of 
processing (e.g., hot rolled sheet/coils). Government ofﬁcials argue that 
measures to curb outﬂows of low-value-added materials should serve 
the conservation of precious natural resources and keep domestic energy 
consumption, environmental pollution and greenhouse gas emissions in 
check (GOSC 2010; MIIT 2009). As for the case of coke, these objectives 
may be well in line with public interest in a country that already suffers 
from serious environmental damage, energy shortages and heavily relies 
on burning coal (a major input for the coking process) for electricity 
generation and heating such as China.9
But the whole extent of trade constraints suggests that there are other 
goals involved as well, notably the creation of a signiﬁcant price dif-
ferential for domestic and international consumers of coke and other 
materials. Bottling up vital inputs for steel-making inside the Chinese 
market works to increase domestic supply and depress input prices 
for Chinese steel producers. At the same time, cutting down the export 
volume reduces the supply of these resources on international markets 
and thus functions to keep world market prices (and costs of interna-
tional steel producers) artiﬁcially high—in comparison to a free trade, 
open markets scenario.
Currently, Chinese government authorities are employing ﬁve sepa-
rate mechanisms to either discourage the exportation of certain goods 
or ensure their outﬂows come about at very favourable terms for the 
exporting company and the government budget. These are: (1) export 
licensing, (2) export quotas, (3) export taxes, (4) cancellation of VAT 
rebates on exports and (5) export price coordination. In the following, 
we will give an outline of these restraining mechanisms using the case 
of coke.10
Endowed with large coal deposits, China has evolved to become the 
world's leading coke producer (USGS 2010). With an output of 353 mil-
lion tons in 2009, it accounted for 60 per cent of global output in 2009 
(China Coal Resource Net 2010). Not surprisingly, the country also used 
to be the material's largest exporter: before the recent crisis wreaked 
havoc on global trade, China shipped out 12 million tons in 2007, giving 
it a market share of 47 per cent in volume terms and 41 per cent in value 
terms (United Nations Statistics Division 2010; Sun & Xu 2009). This 
situation changed dramatically in 2009 when export volumes dropped 
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by 96 per cent compared to the previous year (GAC 2010).11 Although 
some part of the collapse can be explained by easing demand, this article 
argues that primarily export restrictions are to blame.
China—like many other countries—maintains an export licensing 
system that mostly serves to monitor cross-border trade of commodities 
and ﬁnished products. In theory, the effect of export licensing on trade 
depends on the degree of intervention and selectivity. In the ideal (free 
markets) case, licenses will be issued automatically and without any 
kind of meaningful administrative procedure directly upon shipment 
since this will cause the least disruption to international trade ﬂows. 
The worst case from this perspective is a situation where companies are 
held up by lengthy, costly or arbitrary administrative procedures.
Since China reserves itself the right to restrict or prohibit the export 
of certain goods it also employs the export licensing scheme as basic 
supervision and control mechanisms to enforce these trade restrictions. 
As the agency responsible for the program, the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) is tasked with drawing up relevant regulations and super-
vising their implementation. MOFCOM entrusts the Quota Licensing 
Bureau (QLB) with the detailed oversight and inspection of all license-
issuing agencies nationwide (MOFCOM 2008). According to China's 
International Trade Law, the General Administration of Customs (GAC) 
and MOFCOM together compile, adjust and publish lists of goods 
that can only be exported after its previous and explicit approval. The 
International Trade Law also authorizes MOFCOM to investigate and 
punish companies, individuals and even government organizations that 
are violating its regulations, for example, by exporting without a license 
or outside the scope of the license or by issuing licenses to unqualiﬁed 
companies. Possible administrative sanctions include the suspension or 
revocation of a company's right to engage in foreign trade activities for 
up to three years, while individuals may face criminal charges.
In most cases, companies applying for export permits are required to 
submit an application form (stamped or sealed) together with a copy of 
the export contract and several other relevant pieces of documentation 
(depending on the nature of the product) for examination by an author-
ized licensing agency. The agency will then determine if the proposed 
export deal is in compliance with national rules and regulations, if all 
submitted documents are complete and valid and if the applicant com-
pany possesses sufﬁcient management expertise to successfully carry 
out the transaction (MOFCOM 2008). Especially the ﬁnal point invites 
a degree of arbitrariness into the process. Once granted, export licenses 
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are valid for a period of up to six months, which may not begin prior to 
1 January and will automatically expire at the end of the calendar year 
regardless of the time of issuance. Besides imposing time constraints on 
exporting enterprises, the licensing scheme can also force companies to 
declare export goods at one particular customs ofﬁce or ship their total 
export volume in a single batch (MOFCOM 2008).
In May 2007, at a time of particularly fast export growth, MOFCOM 
and the GAC introduced an export licensing system concerning low-
value-added steel products, such as rebar, wire rod, plates and narrow 
strip as well as several section products, while more advanced product 
categories like the majority of cold rolled sheet, galvanized products 
and all pipes were exempted (MOFCOM & GAC 2007). This indicates 
that Chinese authorities aimed selectively at controlling—and if nec-
essary curbing—-low-end materials while leaving the more technol-
ogy-intensive goods unaffected. The system included only a simple 
company registration process and did not involve elaborate application 
and examination procedures. At the time of introduction it covered 
product categories that had previously accounted for almost half of 
total export volume in steel products. By the end of 2008, when global 
market demand began to decline in the early phase of the global eco-
nomic downturn, the export licensing system was terminated (China 
Mining 2009). While in operation, this system caused few distortions 
on market dynamics nor did it discriminate against speciﬁc companies 
on the grounds of size, ownership structure or other criteria. But not 
all export licensing schemes are as non-discriminate and transparent. 
The system could have evolved in a different direction if a reduction of 
export volumes would have come up on the agenda of China's admin-
istrators, as can be observed with respect to other Chinese export goods 
subjected to non-automatic licensing schemes. Practices employed here 
include speciﬁc eligibility threshold levels such as export performance, 
ﬁnancial capabilities, as well as the ﬁling of detailed application docu-
ments, bidding processes, etc. (USA 2010).
The administrative procedures introduced by non-automatic licens-
ing are an important institutional foundation for the imposition and 
administration of export quotas on a variety of goods. China's Interna-
tional Trade Law designates MOFCOM as the agency responsible for 
administrating export quotas. As such, the ministry determines total 
quota amounts for different goods, evaluates individual quota ap-
plications and allocates quotas to speciﬁc companies (MOFTEC 2001; 
MOFCOM 2008). Though coke exports have been subjected to quotas 
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for many years, only after they were cut by 25 per cent in 2004 has the 
issue attracted increased attention. But MOFCOM does not announce 
total annual export quotas for coke in advance. Instead, the ministry 
typically issues two notices a year that list approved companies with 
their respective quota allocations. Consequently, the total quota amount 
for one year can only be calculated ex-post by adding up the individual 
amounts as issued in the notices published during that year. For indi-
vidual enterprises, this practice entails substantial planning insecurity 
and business risk.
The increasingly stringent requirements for obtaining quota alloca-
tions (MOFCOM various years) and the administrative hurdles com-
plicating export transactions combined to bring down the number of 
approved coke exporters from 70 in 2006 to 34 for 2011 (with an addi-
tional 21 applications still pending in December 2010) (MOFCOM 2010). 
However, the total annual quota volume for coke has remained within 
a narrow range of 13 to 14 million metric tons since 2006, effectively 
boosting the individual quota allocations. It should be highlighted that 
approved coke exports account for only a small fraction of total Chinese 
coke output of about 350 million tons in 2009 and 2010.
Export restrictions on coke have led to irritations between China 
and other countries, such as the US, which have in the past procured 
substantial amounts of coke 'made in China'. The 2007 National Trade 
Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers compiled by the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR 2007) shows that export restrictions have 
a signiﬁcant adverse effect on US integrated steel producers and their 
customers, as China's tight export restrictions have pushed up export 
prices. In a series of meetings the United States urged China to eliminate 
the practice of using export restrictions, not just for coke but also for 
other products. In May 2005, the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) announced the cancellation of the coke export 
quota system as of 1 January 2006 (USTR 2007). But it was not meant 
to be. The decision was revised and the quota system stayed in place 
although with a raised quota of 14 million metric tons for 2006. Even 
today the export quota keeps international coke prices high and ensures 
that coke prices in China remain signiﬁcantly below world market level. 
At the time of writing, the export quota system was still in force and 
there has been no indication of when it might be eliminated.
Chinese export duties take the form of ad valorem taxes levied upon 
exportation of certain goods. In some cases, like coke, duties are com-
bined with export quotas to amplify the restricting effect. According 
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to Chinese Regulations on Import and Export Duties, either shall be 
imposed on any good upon entering or leaving the country unless de-
cided otherwise by the state council (State Council 2003). There are two 
government agencies trusted with administering import and export du-
ties: the Customs Tariff Commission is mainly in charge of determining 
which goods are subjected to duties and adjusting relevant duty rates 
(State Council 2003). The GAC is tasked with the actual supervision 
and control of goods entering or leaving the country. As such, it collects 
duties as well as other charges related to goods crossing the border into 
or out of China. It should be noted that other raw materials used for 
steel-making, such as zinc, are affected as well (USA 2010).
As early as November 2006, the Chinese government imposed export 
duties of 5 per cent on coke. Duties were gradually raised to 15 per cent 
in June 2007, to 25 per cent in January 2008 and ﬁnally to the current 
level of 40 per cent in August 2008. Addressing the various steps, gov-
ernment authorities have argued that a rebound of coke exports had 
to be prevented. Considering that export volumes had been already 
capped by export quotas, as outlined above, the ofﬁcial line of argument 
is hard to follow. Price and Nance (2010), comparing the development 
of coke prices for domestic consumption and export, ﬁnd that a large 
gap had formed between 2007 and 2008. While there was no price dif-
ference to speak of in January 2007, with one ton of coke for both do-
mestic consumption and exports costing about US$150, by December 
2008 coke prices for domestic consumption had risen to about US$200, 
while export quotations reached as high as US$241. The resulting price 
difference conferred a discount of more than 50 per cent upon domestic 
coke users. Assuming an average input ratio of 0.6 tons of coke per ton 
of crude steel (World Coal Institute 2007), the beneﬁt in input costs per 
ton of crude steel that could be claimed by Chinese steel-makers was 
US$400. This is a very sizable advantage considering that in December 
2008 the average sales price per ton of hot rolled sheet in the Chinese 
market stood at about US$550.12 Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the effect of 
export restrictions on Chinese coke exports.
In 1994 China introduced a value added tax (VAT) that is levied 
on producers upon sales of nearly all goods and services. Rates vary 
depending on product category and amount, up to 17 per cent for steel 
products and most resources. While imported goods are subjected to the 
tax, exports are partially exempted. This is intended to avoid disadvan-
tages for Chinese exporters competing on foreign markets that are not 
subject to VAT (HKTDC 2009). However, VAT exemptions for exports 
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FIGURE 1: Production, Exports and Export Ratio of Coke
Source: CISA various years.
do not apply uniformly to all goods but are administered on a product-
speciﬁc basis as a way to support Chinese industry policies. Following 
this logic, tax and customs authorities have gradually reduced or even 
cancelled VAT rebates to discourage export of certain goods (Ernst & 
Young 2007). As a matter of fact, rebates for coke have been abolished. 
The same is true for semi-ﬁnished steel products such as billet and slab. 
This shift in trade policies has led to a sharp drop in export quantities 
(if export volumes were not already limited by quotas) and a domestic 
price level that is lower than it should be under normal circumstances. 
Limiting the outﬂows of billet and slab has two effects, which are in 
line with China's industrial policy framework for the steel industry. 
First, downstream production processes can beneﬁt from cheaper ac-
cess to an important input. Though large integrated steel mills usually 
do not purchase billet from the market but rely on the output of their 
own converters instead, many rolling mills that do not possess their 
own steel smelting capacities depend on the market availability of this 
semi-ﬁnished product. Thus, reduced price levels will eventually show 
a positive effect on the steel rolling and processing business. Second, 
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market potential and proﬁtability of upstream producers is largely 
reduced, paving the way for industry consolidation. While basic steel 
smelting is a fairly low-value-added and low-tech activity compared to 
ﬁnishing processes downstream, it consumes large amounts of resources 
and energy and puts severe strain on the environment through pollution 
and greenhouse gas emissions. To remedy an industrial lay-out featuring 
a large number of small-scale enterprises employing basic production 
technology, the government actively supports industry consolidation 
characterized as the crystallization of a small number of large, integrated 
enterprises that possess strong technological capacities and international 
competitiveness. This approach speciﬁcally aims to crowd out small, 
inefﬁcient players of the market (GOSC 2010; State Council 2010).
A similar development strategy as in the case of coke can also be 
observed with respect to billet and hot rolled (HR) strip. The latter is 
a fairly basic steel product that is commonly used as input for making 
more sophisticated goods. For rolling mills that produce cold rolled sheet 
(CR sheet), hot-dip galvanized sheet (HDG sheet), welded tubes and 
many other goods, HR strip is the single most important input—both 
FIGURE 2: Chinese Coke Exports and Related Restrictions
Source: CISA various years.
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in technical and in ﬁnancial terms. In other words, the cost of making 
or buying HR sheet usually determines a mill's proﬁtability.
In its 2007 Hot Rolled Sheet Reinvestigation Memorandum, the 
Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) came to the conclusion that 
domestic HR sheet prices in China are largely determined by the govern-
ment and are not substantially the same as they would be if determined 
by a competitive market environment. The document cites various news 
clips and reports that point out the strong government intervention in 
the Chinese steel industry. The investigation identiﬁed instruments of 
government inﬂuence in the Chinese steel sector that have also been 
documented in the preceding sections of this article (CBSA 2007).
In the years preceding the world ﬁnancial crisis, the Chinese govern-
ment has resorted to VAT rebate adjustments in order to put an end 
to soaring exports of HR strip (and sheet). Step by step, rebates were 
cut from 11 per cent in 2006 to zero in April 2007. Government ofﬁcials 
have explained that through imposing these measures, they wanted to 
better control production and exports, prevent more trade disputes, 
phase out inefﬁcient capacities, cut down energy consumption and 
protect the environment. The diminished proﬁtability of international 
sales effectively reduced the outﬂow of HR strip and increased supply 
in the domestic market entailing a price depressing effect (see Taube & 
in der Heiden 2009).
When the shock waves caused by the global economic downturn 
reached China in 2009, the country's steel industry was under severe 
stress to cope with faltering demand and depressed prices. As a way 
to support ailing steel-makers, the central government opted for a 
reinstatement of export VAT rebates on HR products in the order of 9 
per cent in June 2009. Consequently, exports rebounded since Chinese-
made HR sheet regained competitiveness in major export markets such 
as South Korea. As China and the world economy gradually turned 
toward economic recovery, exports soared again, which inspired the 
government to once again terminate VAT rebates on HR strip in July 
2010 (see Figure 3). 
This brief history of adjustments illustrates that the Chinese govern-
ment considers VAT rebates a legitimate and effective tool to steer ex-
ports in ways conducive to its industrial policy framework. This notion 
is supported by the fact that export restrictions did not target the more 
advanced downstream products like cold rolled sheet or galvanized 
sheet in the same way. Steel mills are still entitled to receive a VAT rebate 
of 9 per cent on exports of high-grade CR sheet and HDG sheet.
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While the mechanisms described so far were mainly intended to curb 
exports, mandatory export price coordination—which can be equated to 
setting a minimum price for exports—also serves to maximize the gains 
from exports. Access to detailed information is complicated because 
relevant documents are not in the public domain. As a major difference 
compared to the other tools described earlier, the coordination of export 
prices is largely run by the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, 
Minerals and Chemicals Importers and Exporters (CCCMC), a privately 
organized representative association of over 4,200 industry members. 
Founded in 1988, CCCMC originally served to coordinate export activi-
ties of Chinese companies and improve their competitiveness in world 
markets. Today the chamber deﬁnes itself as a comprehensive service 
provider to its members (CCCMC 2010). According to the self-introduc-
tion found on the CCCMC website, services include:
coordination service in metals, minerals, chemicals exports, coordination 
service in bidding commodities, organization service at the Chinese Export 
Commodities Fair, organizing response to anti-dumping lawsuits, verifying 
export prices for customs clearance , Internet information service, overseas 
exhibition & training service (CCCMC 2010)
But CCCMC does not conform to the Western understanding of 
industry associations as being platforms to organize and represent 
private interests vis-à-vis government authorities (USA 2010). Instead, 
Source: CISA various years.
FIGURE 3: Exports of Hot Rolled Strip and Related Export Restric-
tions
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CCCMC—like other chambers of commerce in China—has assumed 
some regulatory power and responsibilities from state organs (in this 
case MOFCOM) to support the implementation of their industrial strat-
egies and engage in active supervision. As such, CCCMC is under the 
authority of MOFCOM and acts on its behalf. Several sub-organizations 
are in charge of coordination activities regarding various commodities, 
such as coke and zinc (USA 2010). These units are authorized to audit 
member companies to assess their compliance with coordination pro-
grams and set penalties for violators.
Exports of Finished Products
Chinese steel exports have only picked up after China's WTO entry. 
Since 2006, it has remained a net-exporter of steel in volume terms. After 
a strong but unsteady rise in the years preceding the world economic 
crisis, export volumes topped off at 63 million tons in 2007 (WSA 2010). 
Exports are dominated by medium and lower product ranges with long 
products accounting for the largest share (EDRCMI various years). The 
Chinese government is promoting export activities on a highly selec-
tive basis, targeting high-value-added, technology-intensive products 
as the vanguard of China's steel exports. Speciﬁc measures include the 
rebate of a large part of the VAT paid. This is meant to offset competitive 
disadvantages in international markets13 and allows for a discretionary 
steering of export activities. These rebates may be coupled with income 
tax reductions if exports surpass 50 per cent of a company's total sales 
volume. Further measures comprise preferential export loans and guar-
antee schemes provided by the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM 
Bank) as well as other state-owned ﬁnancial institutions (see Taube & 
in der Heiden 2010 for details).
As outlined in the preceding section, VAT rebates and export quotas 
are employed by the Chinese government as highly ﬂexible instruments 
for discretionarily steering corporate export activities. These measures are 
commonly used to promote exports of higher-value-added products and 
discourage exports of resource-intensive but low-tech products, such as 
rebar. If deemed necessary, for example, due to changing market conditions 
or escalating trade frictions, rebates and quotas can be adjusted on short 
notice in order to strengthen or weaken export incentives. This way, Chinese 
authorities are also capable of inﬂuencing the composition of steel exports 
and pushing companies to shift their export portfolio towards more high-
value-added, technology-intensive products. Figure 4 illustrates the effect 
of export restrictions on outﬂows of low-end products, such as rebar.
taube.indd   125 17-12-2011   13:40:55
126 ___________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 29(2)•2011
Peter in der Heiden and Markus Taube ________________________________
Besides ﬁscal measures to manipulate export activities, directed bank 
lending also plays an important role (MIIT 2009). Some state-owned 
banks that have become shareholders of Chinese steel-makers through 
debt-to-equity swaps in the years preceding China's accession to the 
WTO also have a strong interest in supporting the steel industry in its 
efforts to get a foothold in the international markets (World Bank 2000; 
People's Daily Online 2000).
The EXIM Bank has been created as 'a state policy bank under the 
direct leadership of the State Council' with the mandate 'to implement 
the state policies in industry, foreign trade and economy and ﬁnance 
to provide policy ﬁnancial support so as to promote exports [... and to] 
support Chinese companies with competitive advantages to "go global" 
for offshore construction contracts and overseas investment projects' 
(MOFCOM 2006). In 2004, for example, the bank signed a 'Cooperation 
Agreement of Export Credit Loans to Support International Business' 
with Baosteel, pledging RMB 10 billion in export credit loans with low 
interest rates and long-term maturity to help the enterprise develop 
internationalized business.14 Guangdong Shaogang Songshan Co., Ltd. 
in 2005 received interest discounts worth RMB 576,389 as a gratiﬁcation 
for its successful export activities (Guangdong Shaogang Songshan Co., 
Ltd. 2005). 
FIGURE 4: Exports of Rebar and Related Export Restrictions
Source: CISA various years.
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Rapidly rising Chinese exports both before and after the world eco-
nomic crisis have led to tensions with major trade partners, notably 
the European Union, the United States and Canada, but also a number 
of developing countries. After numerous studies and countervailing 
duty investigations have identiﬁed government subsidy schemes sup-
porting Chinese steel-makers to compete in the global arena (see Taube 
& in der Heiden 2009 for details), CISA and leading decision-making 
bodies in China's steel community are very much aware of the fact that 
the Chinese export offensive in the OECD economies of Europe, North 
America and South Korea is causing uneasiness in these countries and 
raises the 'danger' of trade measures against China designed to correct 
the non-market-based cost advantages of Chinese exporters. Luo Bing-
sheng, CISA executive vice president, for example, has been quoted by 
the Chinese news agency Xinhua as urging 'Chinese steel producers and 
dealers to curb exports at certain periods to avoid dumping charges'.15 
This statement is but one example of how government authorities and 
CISA, as a kind of supervisory organization, signal domestic steel-mak-
ers the current political 'guiding opinion' towards certain aspects of 
global market integration and outline the range of 'politically correct 
behaviour'. Furthermore, such statements are often accompanied by 
actual policies directly intervening in the incentive systems determining 
the behaviour of exporters.
This section has illustrated that while economic policy-makers in 
China are determined to increase international integration of their do-
mestic steel industry through trade, they reserve themselves the right to 
steer the depth and direction of this process. Clearly, Chinese enterprises 
are discouraged and sometimes forbidden to compete on the low end 
of the international market while for those who are able to target the 
high end, obstacles are few and far between. Political measures govern-
ing international trade integration are highly discretionary. By artiﬁ-
cially depressing the domestic price of an important input resource, hot 
rolled sheet, and simultaneously offering export incentives for ﬁnished 
products, the authorities are effectively stimulating outﬂows of high-
value-added, high-tech steel goods like cold rolled sheet or hot-dipped 
galvanized sheet.16 As such, the Chinese government is distorting the 
inter-sectoral market structure as well as China's export composition. 
Seen from a macro-perspective, it is directly intervening in the 'natural' 
domestic as well as international market development.
taube.indd   127 17-12-2011   13:40:56
128 ___________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 29(2)•2011
Peter in der Heiden and Markus Taube ________________________________
Cross Border Investment in China's Iron and Steel 
Industry 
Inward Foreign Direct Investment
With respect to the treatment of foreign investors, the Chinese govern-
ment is following a two-pronged strategy, trying to strike a balance 
between both the need to attract investors in order to get access to su-
perior foreign technology, management skills and business models on 
the one hand, and the fear of a sell-out of national assets and foreign 
domination of the domestic steel industry—which is deﬁned as a stra-
tegic pillar industry—on the other hand.
The Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment, which is 
updated at irregular intervals and provides for encouragement as well 
as restrictions for foreign investors depending on parameters such as 
product category, technology content, export orientation, etc., has been 
of speciﬁc importance for guiding foreign investment in China's steel 
industry, especially in its 1997 edition (NDRC and MOFCOM various 
years).17 Since then, the Catalogue has lost in importance for the steel 
industry and has been replaced by speciﬁc local regulations as well as 
the Iron and Steel Industry Development Policy (ISIDP) published in 
July 2005 (NDRC 2005).
With respect to the intention to attract technologically advanced in-
vestment projects, the ISIDP provides detailed information on technolo-
gies China wishes to attract as well as the ones that are discouraged. In 
addition, the ISIDP (Article 23) clariﬁes that only experienced enterprises 
with a formidable track record of successful business operations will be 
allowed to invest in China. In order to become eligible to apply for an 
investment project in China, foreign investors must: 
possess iron and steel technology with independent intellectual property 
rights and should have produced at least 10 million tons of carbon steel 
or at least 1 million tons of high-alloyed special steel in the previous year 
(ISIDP, Article 23).
With these entrance requirements, the Chinese government openly 
discriminates against foreign investors who face tougher entrance bar-
riers than domestic investors. Domestic investors who plan investment 
projects in the ﬁelds of iron-making, steel-making or steel-rolling need 
to fund 40 per cent of the total equity by themselves, meet all require-
ments laid out in various laws and regulations on environmental pro-
tection, ecology and production security, possess ﬁnancial strength, 
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advanced technological and managerial know-how and command a 
complete sales network. If a Chinese steel company wants to expand 
across administrative regions inside China it also needs to prove that 
it had owned capacities for smelting 5 million tons of carbon steel or 
500,000 tons of special steel in the previous year. In any case, domestic 
investors are not required to possess their own technology. Moreover, 
for a foreign company, capacity thresholds are twice as high as for 
domestic companies.
At the same that China is courting (and sometimes prodding) for-
eign investors to transfer their latest technology to China and make it 
available to the local steel industry, China rejects the request of foreign 
investors to pursue wholly foreign-owned greenﬁeld investments or to 
acquire majority or controlling stakes in Chinese steel enterprises. As 
such, foreign investors are forced to forge joint ventures with Chinese 
partners if they wish to enter the Chinese market.
All foreign investment activities (greenﬁeld as well as merger and 
acquisitions (M&A) transactions) must be approved by the NDRC, 
which consults CISA and the leading (local) steel enterprises in the 
course of the approval process. Leading representatives of CISA have 
made it crystal clear that they do not intend to grant foreign investors a 
dominant role in individual steel joint ventures (except for very speciﬁc 
reasons in peripheral business ﬁelds) and least of all in the Chinese 
steel industry as a whole.18 By restricting access of foreign investors 
to China's steel industry, the government is meddling with the mar-
ket-based allocation of capital and productive resources. Competitive 
processes are inhibited and comparatively unproductive domestic 
players unduly promoted.
Outward Foreign Direct Investment
In 1997, the 15th National Party Congress for the ﬁrst time clearly 
stated the need to 'encourage outward investments that can bring 
to bear the country's relative competitive advantage and to improve 
the utilization of […] two markets and two resources' (NCCPC 1997). 
One year later, the second plenary session of the 15th Central Party 
Committee stipulated to 'support a group of strong and competitive 
state-owned enterprises to go abroad, mainly to Africa, Central Asia, 
Middle East, Central Europe, South America and other regions, in 
order to set up factories there' (NCCPC 1998). After 1999 witnessed a 
plethora of regulatory documents aimed at promoting outward invest-
ments and putting in place a basic institutional framework in the form 
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of rules and regulations, the following year marked the birth of the 
so called 'Going Out' Strategy. First introduced in the 10th Five-Year 
Plan (2001-2005) it was carried over into the 11th Five-Year Programme 
(2006-2010) and is set not only to be continued but strengthened in 
the foreseeable future. The Proposal for the Formulation of the 12th 
Five-Year Programme (2011-2015), promulgated in October 2010 by the 
Central Commission of the Communist Party, stipulates to accelerate 
the implementation of the Going Out Strategy and guide companies 
to invest overseas.
Chinese authorities attach great importance to the Going Out Strat-
egy and regard it as a way to expand the development potential of 
the Chinese economy because it helps to achieve four objectives: (1) 
improve the supply of required resources, (2) stimulate product ex-
ports, (3) foster Chinese multinationals and brands, and (4) diversify 
production locations and sales markets to ease trade frictions (GOSC 
2006). Over the past ten years, most policy documents targeting the steel 
industry's development contain a reference to the Going Out Strategy 
and call upon enterprises to venture abroad. The Adjustment and Re-
vitalization Program for the Iron and Steel Industry (ARPISI), released 
in March 2009 at the height of the world ﬁnancial crisis by the MIIT 
(2009), for example, demands that 'companies seize opportunities and 
actively pursue the Going Global Strategy' (ARPISI, Article 2.5.5). The 
Chinese government's support for steel-makers' outward investments 
is threefold: (1) ﬁnancial support, (2) administrative support and (3) 
informational and other support.
Financial support comes in different forms, such as preferential ac-
cess to capital markets and bank credit from state-owned commercial 
or policy banks (ARPISI, Article 4.9). In some cases, companies can 
also beneﬁt from low-cost loans. When Baosteel took over a 15 per cent 
interest in Aquila Resources, an Australian company investing in min-
eral deposits, in August 2009, the Chinese steel-maker agreed to help 
Aquila secure ﬁnancing from Chinese ﬁnancial institutions to help the 
development of its projects.19 In June 2010 it was reported that Aquila 
had reached an initial agreement with the China Development Bank 
(CDB), one of three Chinese policy banks, to develop iron ore and cok-
ing coal projects. This does not come as a surprise since Baosteel is one 
of the CDB's strategic partners.20
Cash grants are another way for government authorities to support 
overseas investments. Jiangsu Shagang for example, has received a sub-
sidy of RMB 1.35 million for its iron ore project in Australia in 2005 mak-
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ing the company the largest recipient of such funds in Jiangsu Province 
in that year. The money was paid out to the Zhangjiagang City-based 
parent company via the local ﬁnance and budget ofﬁces.21
Key steel-makers can also apply for support from various govern-
ment-sponsored assistance funds. The ARPISI urges companies to make 
full use of three separate special funds: the Fund for Mining Rights to 
Overseas Mineral Resources, the Fund for Economic and Technical Co-
operation Overseas and the Fund for Reducing Risk in Prospecting of 
Overseas Mineral Deposits. Mining operations of key steel enterprises 
can be promoted in a variety of ways stretching from the prospecting 
and exploitation of foreign ore deposits to technical cooperation and 
acquisitions (ARPISI, Article 4.10). 
Since 1998, the CDB has launched several large ﬁnancial vehicles, such 
as the China Africa Development Fund (CADF), to support Chinese 
investment of all industries in certain regions. The CADF, established 
in 2007 with a registered capital of US$ 1 billion and the CDB as its sole 
shareholder, 'aims to support Chinese companies to develop the coop-
eration with Africa and enter the African market'. It can be assumed that 
the fund will operate in line with current investment promotion policies 
since 'CDB has accumulated profound experience vis-à-vis investing in 
Africa through its "Going Global" initiative' (CADF 2010).
Besides subsidies and favourable conditions for credit ﬁnancing, 
companies can also take advantage of special tax incentives. As recently 
as 2010, the State Administration of Taxation (SAT) (2010) promised to 
increase ﬁscal support and ease the tax burden for enterprises following 
the Going Out Strategy. Relevant measures were to favourably adjust 
and clarify guidelines for tax credits and export taxes. Furthermore, 
steps were announced to prevent double taxation for both corporate 
and personal income tax.
Administrative support involves the simpliﬁcation of administra-
tive procedures and the elimination of bureaucratic barriers that have 
delayed or crippled overseas investment projects in the past. As China 
began to rapidly build up foreign exchange reserves, a host of regulations 
restricting the use of foreign currency became increasingly obsolete and 
were ﬁnally abolished in 2006. In the same year, the General Ofﬁce of the 
State Council (GOSC) (2006) listed institutional deﬁciencies as the most 
important obstacle to outward investments and promised the reduction 
or cancellation of certain registration and approval procedures. While 
this point appeared to be high up on the central government's agenda, 
surprisingly little headway has been made since then because three 
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years later, the ARPISI again announced a streamlining of ofﬁcial project 
approval procedures and improvements of administrative proceedings 
in areas such as credit, foreign exchange, taxation, human resources 
and immigration (ARPISI, Article 4.10). However, even as late as 2010, 
the Development and Research Centre of the State Council (2010) still 
criticized the approval procedures for investors as too complicated, 
intransparent and time consuming.22
Informational and other kinds of support covers a wide range of 
services provided by government organizations inside and outside 
China. In 2003, MOFCOM established the Foreign Investment Promo-
tion Centre and launched an online database to help Chinese companies 
obtain and exchange relevant information. Reports concerning invest-
ment opportunities, relevant laws and regulations, trade barriers and 
other issues in different countries are published as well. In addition, 
economic and trade sections of Chinese embassies and consulate of-
ﬁces offer counselling to Chinese companies, help facilitate investment 
projects, support public relations activities or use their political clout for 
the beneﬁt of Chinese investors. SAT has promised to assist companies 
venturing abroad by clarifying regulations, improving related informa-
tion services and pursuing double tax conventions with other countries. 
To reduce the risk for investors, MOFCOM has signed agreements on 
the protection of investments with many countries and the state-owned 
China Export and Credit Insurance Company provides investment 
insurance services particularly relevant for miners active in politically 
unstable African countries.
From a functional perspective, government support for overseas in-
vestments by Chinese steel-makers concentrates on three focal points: 
(1) mining operations, (2) global sales and customer service networks 
and (3) production facilities.
As pointed out earlier, the rapid development of the Chinese econ-
omy—characterized by massive urbanization and industrialization 
trends—has fuelled an even more rapid expansion of domestic steel 
production that has driven the once self-sufﬁcient steel sector towards 
high levels of import dependence and steep price increases for raw 
materials. Although this environment should be incentive enough for 
Chinese steel-makers to engage in overseas mining investments,23 the 
government is exerting inﬂuence as well. Mei Xinyu, a research fellow 
at the MOFCOM Research Centre, was quoted in July 2010 as saying 
that political power is now playing a major role in purchasing overseas 
mineral assets (Mysteel 2010). The ISIDP demands an intensiﬁcation 
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of overseas investment and international cooperation in mining op-
erations and calls for the establishment of supply bases for iron ore, 
chromium ore, manganese ore, nickel ore, scrap steel and other raw 
materials. Furthermore, it promises support for large key enterprises 
investing in the exploitation of overseas mineral deposits by way of 
M&A, joint ventures or cooperation agreements with foreign counter-
parts or through direct purchases of mining rights (ISIDP, Article 30; 
ARPISI, Article 3.8). CISA echoes government calls for greater overseas 
investments of China's steel conglomerates, urging them to increase 
the share of directly controlled overseas iron ore resources to one-third 
and eventually 60 per cent of Chinese import demand. For the time 
being, Chinese companies control less than 20 per cent of China's total 
import tonnage by means of overseas direct investment stakes (Taube 
& in der Heiden 2009).
A speciﬁc feature of government support is 'FDI plus ofﬁcial develop-
ment assistance (ODA)' packages, which provide for a complementary set 
of business investments and infrastructure development. Such activities 
in recent years have been observed with increasing frequency in Latin 
America and Africa. With respect to steel industry interests, Mauritania 
as well as Brazil have come into the focus of this new approach.
Besides steel-makers, mining companies are also encouraged to ven-
ture abroad. In a research paper, the Development Research Centre of 
the State Council (2010) reﬂects on Chinalco's failed attempt to increase 
its stake in Australia's second largest iron ore miner, Rio Tinto. The deal 
was met by unexpected levels of resistance from existing shareholders 
as well as the Australian public and political circles. The authors sug-
gest that Chinese mining companies, not steel-makers, should invest 
in overseas mineral deposits since they operate on the same step of 
the value chain as their investment target and do not simultaneously 
act as customers with an inherent interest to drive down sales prices, 
which would undermine company proﬁts and harm the interests of 
other investors.
Like steel-makers, miners can also claim government support for over-
seas investments. Since 2000, MOFCOM has established special funds 
to support mining enterprises by reducing the ﬁnancial risk involved in 
conducting preliminary works such as feasibility studies. According to 
Xinhua, state funding has facilitated a series of risky prospecting projects 
abroad.24 Furthermore, the GOSC (2006) suggested accommodating the 
needs of predominantly non-state mining companies with transparent 
ownership structure, successful business operations, strong competitive-
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ness, advanced corporate governance systems and an internationalized 
workforce in terms of access to foreign currency, credit volumes and 
insurance coverage.
All large Chinese steel conglomerates are actively pushing the de-
velopment of global sales and customer service networks. Since major 
customers in the automotive, machinery and shipbuilding industries 
require close coordination and cooperation with their steel suppliers 
regarding product speciﬁcations and quality, maintaining a local pres-
ence in foreign markets is particularly important. Furthermore, as new 
entrants in most overseas markets, Chinese companies usually face 
tough competition from other international steel-makers with well 
established business connections. Subsequently, setting up their own 
ofﬁces becomes an essential success factor. The ARPISI is among the 
policy documents that address the need to set up international sales 
and service networks (ARPISI, Article 4.10).
The promotion of overseas production facilities is a relatively new 
approach that policy documents have not yet addressed in detail and 
only a very few steel-makers, such as Wuhan Steel, are undertaking 
serious steps to build up production facilities abroad (China Mining 
2010). Many projects announced in the past were either postponed or 
abandoned, like the steel plant joint venture of Baosteel and Vale in 
Brazil.25 Encouraging mills to set up overseas production bases aims 
at reducing domestic consumption of energy and resources, limiting 
environmental damage and greenhouse gas emissions as well as easing 
the pressure on domestic (transportation) infrastructure. Jia Yinsong, an 
ofﬁcial with the MIIT, told reporters that 'Chinese enterprises should be 
aware of the signiﬁcance of transforming from production exports to 
capacity exports', while a senior representative for CISA urges Chinese 
steelmakers to 'learn from the Japanese counterparts who followed au-
tomobile manufacturers abroad, providing [them] with matching steel 
products from their overseas mills'.26
The establishment of overseas production bases is also expected to 
reduce international trade frictions. Already in 2006, the GOSC (2006) 
announced support for enterprises from industries with relatively large 
production resources to set up overseas processing bases.27 One effect 
the paper highlights is that in this way, companies can diversify the 
place of origin of their manufactured products so they show up in trade 
statistics as exports from other countries—not China. Tianjin Pipe Group 
is a good example of a Chinese steel-maker whose investment loca-
tion decision was inﬂuenced by foreign trade barriers. The company's 
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American export business was strongly affected by the US Department 
of Commerce's decision to impose import duties of up to 99 per cent on 
its main product: seamless pipes. The company decided to set up shop 
inside the United States and invest US$ 1 billion in a manufacturing 
plant for seamless pipes in Corpus Christi, Texas (Prasso 2010).
Overall, FDI has proved an important avenue for China as it has 
pursued closer integration with the world economy. With regard to the 
steel industry, Chinese government authorities did not launch an all-out 
opening trend but rather held a utilitarian stance. This was based on their 
long-term objective to upgrade production technology, improve product 
portfolio and optimize product quality for maximum competitiveness. 
While barriers limiting outﬂows have been lowered, for example, by 
access to ﬁnancing, or eliminated, with access to foreign currency, for 
example, they stand tall with inﬂows. Regulation governing inward 
FDI continues to restrict access to foreign companies that both possess 
advanced technologies and are prepared to share those with local joint 
venture counterparts. This serves to maximize potential spillovers. At 
the same time, international players wanting to go it alone in China or 
set up production in the low or medium product range continue to be 
unwelcome. Furthermore, nine years into Chinese WTO membership, 
foreign companies still do not stand a chance of ofﬁcial approval for 
acquisitions of controlling stakes in local steel-makers. 
Conclusion
Seen in perspective, the integration of China's steel industry into the 
global economy has been a major transition. The process itself, how-
ever, has been heavily inﬂuenced by the plans and ambitions successive 
generations of economic policy-makers have worked out for 'their' steel 
industry. As a strategically important—and militarily relevant—branch 
of industry, steel-making has attracted constant attention and was sub-
ject to tight regulation. Industrial policy measures at the global market 
interface have therefore evolved to comprise a large variety of measures 
and means, from taxes and tariffs to government-mandated bank loans 
and ODA, in order to discretionarily steer the intensity of global mar-
ket integration. By acting as a gate-keeper controlling all inward- and 
outward-directed activities, the Chinese government has been trying 
to hold the market forces in check and gain maximum advantage for 
China, its iron and steel industry and the economy as a whole. In doing 
so, China's administrators have demonstrated a remarkable degree of 
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undogmatic ﬂexibility and goal orientation. As such, the integration 
of China's steel industry into the global division of labour remains a 
function determined by global market parameters as well as normative 
policies determined in China's top economic policy circles. And inter-
estingly, seen from this perspective, China's integration into the global 
system does not present itself as a one-way street, leading towards ever 
greater integration into the global system. Rather, a vacillating pattern 
emerges, where phases of higher intensities of global market integration 
alternate with an increased decoupling from global developments.
Three major conclusions can be drawn with respect to the political 
intentions and composite effects of the various government interven-
tions, interventions that have been shown to effectively alter the size 
and direction of trade and investment ﬂows.
First, export restrictions for vital inputs and the promotions for higher-
value-added products by Chinese authorities have an immediate and 
an intermediate effect. Firstly, they provide domestic steel-makers with 
access to a large supply of low-priced materials while inﬂicting scarcity 
and price rises on their foreign counterparts. The increased proﬁt margin 
enjoyed by Chinese companies vis-à-vis international competitors frees 
up resources that can be invested in the expansion and modernization 
of domestic production. Secondly, they reduce the supply of Chinese 
steel-making inputs on world markets, causing prices to rise, which 
stimulates additional exports from other countries that would otherwise 
not have occurred. Since foreign countries faced with increased exports 
of raw materials may feel the pinch from lower availability and high 
prices, they could opt to institute their own export barriers. In theory, 
this could lead to a vicious circle with every steel-producing country 
seeking to protect its domestic resources from overseas customers and 
escalating scarcity of freely available materials. 
Second, by limiting foreign investments into its raw material sector and 
the steel industry in particular, government authorities prevent overseas 
steel-makers from setting up shop in China and taking advantage of the 
same favourable conditions enjoyed by Chinese ﬁrms abroad. Further-
more, tight entry regulations ensure that only technologically strong 
international players can engage in joint venture companies targeting 
the high-tech, high-value-added segment. By exclusively attracting in-
vestments in selected areas with the potential of technology spillovers, 
the government is trying to maximize the value of foreign investments 
to the iron and steel industry as well as the economy as a whole.
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Third, since government moves to inﬂuence trade and investment 
patterns are mostly announced on short notice and are therefore hard 
to predict, long-term planning for companies is complicated and has 
to involve second-guessing. Since iron ore mining, coking production 
and steel-making are all capital-intensive industries with long gesta-
tion times, companies both in China and abroad are burdened with 
substantial risks to their business decisions.
By shedding light on the industrial policy guidelines and processes 
implemented by Chinese authorities to closely supervise and steer the 
globalization of the steel industry, this article has demonstrated the 
substantiality of state inﬂuence on global integration patterns. In this 
regard it serves to illustrate the impact on the operations of Chinese ﬁrms 
and, perhaps more importantly, to draw attention to the relevance of 
Chinese state intervention on the present and future development pat-
terns of the international markets for steel and relevant resources. The 
intense regulation of foreign trade and investment in China is bound to 
determine to a large extent the operational parameters for steel-makers 
and processors around the globe.
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NOTES
1  The dramatic cutbacks in most other countries around the world certainly contributed 
to this situation.
2  Crude steel exports topped off in 2007 at 63 million tons before falling back to 25 
million tons in 2009 under the inﬂuence of the global economic crisis. In 2010, on 
the background of robust economic growth in China and spurred by the massive 
stimulus package as well as recovering export demand, crude steel output has 
recovered to 45 million tons. At the time of writing, it was not yet possible to calculate 
a global market share because reliable global output ﬁgures were not available.
3  In value terms.
4  In 2009, the US and Japan exported 21 per cent and 42 per cent respectively (World 
Steel Association 2010).
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5  Both ﬁgures are based on volumes. Adjusting for the generally low average FE-
content of Chinese ores of 30 per cent as compared to the 64+ per cent averages for 
Australia and Brazil, the Chinese iron ore output share shrinks correspondingly. 
Still, China remains the world's largest, if only by a small margin (USGS 2010).
6  People's Daily Online 2010. China's Iron Ore Import Dependency Hits 69% [online], 
28 January. Available from: http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90860/68
81750.html (accessed 12 December 2010).
7  Fifty-two per cent of worldwide iron ore outputs were exported in 2009 (World Steel 
Association, 2010).
8  The price per ton increased roughly sixfold: from about US$28 in 2000 to US$174 in 
late 2010 (World Bank 2010 and Bloomberg Quotes [online]. Available from: http://
www.bloomberg.com (accessed 10 December 2010).
9  It has to be differentiated between coking coal, a bituminous kind of coal with a 
certain content of moisture, ash, sulfur and other components, and coke, the product 
of heating coking coal in batteries at temperatures over 1,000 degrees Celsius for up 
to 36 hours in order to drive off volatile contents.
10  Coke serves as a reducing agent for smelting iron in a blast furnace and is an essential 
ingredient for steel-making.
11  China's share of the global coke market subsequently plummeted to 7 per cent and 
4 per cent in volume and value terms respectively.
12  Bloomberg Quotes [online]. Available from: http://www.bloomberg.com (accessed 
10 December 2010).
13  As most nations grant a 100 per cent refund of VAT paid for goods that have been 
exported, Chinese producers are not entitled to full VAT refunds by the Chinese 
government and subsequently end up with a cost disadvantage vis-à-vis their foreign 
competitors.
14 'China Export-Import Bank's 10 billion Yuan credit loans to help the Baogang Group 
"Walking Out" ', International Finance News, 10 September 2004.
15  'Ofﬁcial calls for stricter control over foreign access to steel sector' [online], 2 August. 
Available from: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-08/02/content_4911048.
htm (accessed 14 December).
16  Interestingly, Chinese government authorities are implementing a combination of 
product-speciﬁc, regional-speciﬁc and sometimes even company-speciﬁc measures, 
which sometimes appear to be redundant. However, given the realities of the Chinese 
iron and steel industry's set-up, this may be the only way to achieve the supreme 
objective of making the domestic steel sector internationally competitive.
17  The latest edition of the catalogue, in place since December 1, 2007, does not contain 
any speciﬁc references to steel industry-relevant investment ﬁelds. 
18  'China CISA blocks Arcelor Mittal steel mill buy' (Reuters), as quoted in China Min-
ing 25 December 2006.
19 'Australian gov't approves China's Baosteel investment of Aquila'. Xinhua, 30 October 
2009.
20 'Aquila Resources says China Development Bank to aid coal, steel projects' [online], 20 
June 2010. Available from: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-21/aquila-
resources-says-china-development-bank-to-aid-coal-steel-projects.html (accessed 7 
December 2010).
21  'China Jiangsu Offering Over 6 M RMB of Subsidies to Overseas Investors', Financial 
Times, 15 February 2006.
22  It states that while projects on average have to pass scrutiny by three government 
departments, state-owned enterprises and insurance ﬁrms face the toughest bureau-
cratic hurdles requiring consent from the most agencies. These may involve the State 
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Administration for Foreign Exchange, the MOFCOM, the National Development and 
Reform Commission, the Ministry of Finance, the State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission, the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commis-
sion or other industry-speciﬁc supervision and administration bodies.
23  Even more so since steel-makers located in coastal areas are particularly encouraged 
to source iron ore, coke as well as other important raw and auxiliary materials from 
the world market (ISIDP at 30).
24  Xinua, 14 December 2004.
25  'Tangled web of interests on Mt Gibson register' [online], The Australian, 25 September 
2009. Available from: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/
tangled-web-of-interests-on-mt-gibson-register/story-e6frg9df-1225779314773 (ac-
cessed 10 December 2010).
26  'Experts urge Chinese steelmakers to build plants abroad to avoid trade barriers' 
[online], Xinhua, 12 May 2010. Available from http://news.xinhuanet.com/eng-
lish2010/china/2010-05/12/c_13288752.htm (accessed 14 December).
27  While the steel industry is not explicitly mentioned in this context, it is beyond doubt 
that the Chinese steel industry has relatively large production potential.
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